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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
PHIPPS, Circuit Judge. 
Edil Joel Galeas Figueroa petitions for relief from a final 
order of removal following his second illegal entry into the 
United States.  To prevent deportation to his native Honduras, 
Galeas Figueroa seeks withholding of removal under both the 
Immigration and Nationality Act and the Convention Against 
Torture, asserting that he would be persecuted and tortured by 
a gang that raped his sister, killed his relatives, and threatened 
him and other family members. 
 
On administrative appeal, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals affirmed a decision by an Immigration Judge denying 
Galeas Figueroa the relief he seeks.  As to statutory 
withholding, the BIA determined that the violence and threats 
by the gang did not amount to governmental persecution, but 
rather constituted private harm for which withholding of 
removal under the INA is unavailable.  In reaching that 
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outcome, the BIA treated as interchangeable two legal 
standards for evaluating the degree of governmental culpability 
in the harmful conduct of private actors: the unable-or-
unwilling-to-control test and the condone-or-complete-
helplessness test.  With respect to CAT protection, the BIA 
concluded that the Honduran government would not acquiesce 
to any torture that Galeas Figueroa might experience because 
Honduran police would investigate reports that Galeas 
Figueroa would make. 
 
Galeas Figueroa petitioned this Court to review the BIA’s 
final order of removal.  He moved for a stay of removal for the 
pendency of his petition, and this Court denied his motion.  
Then, according to the Government, Galeas Figueroa did not 
report to governmental custody as ordered.  Invoking the 
fugitive disentitlement doctrine, the Government moved to 
dismiss Galeas Figueroa’s petition. 
 
Upon consideration of the Government’s motion and 
Galeas Figueroa’s petition, we will deny both.  Galeas 
Figueroa may well be a fugitive disentitled to relief, but the 
Government’s evidence of his fugitive status is insufficiently 
probative to justify discretionary dismissal of his petition.  As 
to the BIA’s denial of Galeas Figueroa’s application for 
statutory withholding of removal, the agency did not err in 
treating the unable-or-unwilling-to-control test and the 
condone-or-complete-helplessness test as legal equivalents.  
And substantial evidence supports its conclusion that Galeas 
Figueroa did not demonstrate the requisite connection between 
the gang’s harmful acts and the Honduran government.  Nor 
was the BIA’s denial of CAT protection unsound.  Substantial 
evidence supports its conclusion that Honduran police would 
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investigate reports from Galeas Figueroa, and thus he failed to 




Galeas Figueroa, a native and citizen of Honduras, has 
twice entered the United States unlawfully.  His explanation 
for doing so unfolds in greater detail with each successive 
telling.   
 
A. Galeas Figueroa’s Illegal Entry in 2010 
 
In 2010, Galeas Figueroa entered the United States without 
inspection or parole.  In his initial interview with a border 
patrol agent, Galeas Figueroa stated that he had come to the 
United States to obtain work in New Jersey and that he had no 
fear of returning to Honduras.  But not long after his entry, 
during a credible-fear interview with an asylum officer, see 
8 C.F.R. § 1208.30, Galeas Figueroa stated that his father, 
uncle, and some cousins were killed in Honduras and that he 
feared their killers would also kill him.  Though he professed 
not to know the assailants or their motives, he reported that his 
father had previously received death threats and surmised that 
gang members had targeted his family out of envy or jealousy.  
Galeas Figueroa also noted that he and his father were 
members of a farmers’ organization, but he did not believe that 
the people who killed his father would want to harm other 
members.  From that information, the asylum officer 
concluded that Galeas Figueroa had a credible fear of 
persecution.   
 
During removal proceedings, Galeas Figueroa applied for 
asylum and statutory withholding of removal under the INA.  
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Through his application and testimony, Galeas Figueroa 
supplied several additional details.  He indicated that a rival 
farmers’ organization seeking to seize his father’s land killed 
his father.  Galeas Figueroa also testified that his father was 
killed for previously reporting to the police his sister’s rape by 
gang members.  He further explained the killings of his uncle 
and his two cousins: his uncle was killed at the same time as 
his father, and his cousins were killed to prevent them from 
retaliating against the killers.  Galeas Figueroa revealed that 
after his father’s death, he fled to another part of Honduras and 
after receiving death threats, to the United States.  The 
Immigration Judge ultimately concluded that Galeas Figueroa 
was not entitled to relief, denied his application, and ordered 
him removed.  Galeas Figueroa waived any appeal and was 
removed to Honduras the following week. 
 
B. Galeas Figueroa’s Illegal Entry in 2012 
 
After remaining in Honduras for approximately one year, 
Galeas Figueroa reentered the United States in 2012.  He came 
with his longtime girlfriend but not his children.  They lived 
undetected in New Jersey for several years, but in late 2017, 
the Department of Homeland Security reinstated Galeas 
Figueroa’s prior removal order. 
 
During a reasonable-fear interview, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31, 
Galeas Figueroa again expressed fear of returning to Honduras.  
This time, he attributed the deaths of his family members to 
either the Mara 18 gang or the MS-13 gang.  He explained that 
one of those gangs raped his sister, and after his father reported 
the assault to the police, the gang killed his father (and his 
uncle) in retaliation.  As told by Galeas Figueroa, that sequence 
of events repeated with his cousins.  After one cousin reported 
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his father’s and uncle’s murders to the police, the gang killed 
him.  And after another cousin reported the first cousin’s 
murder, the gang killed him as well.  Galeas Figueroa informed 
the asylum officer that the gang then turned their attention to 
him, threatening to kill him for trying to protect his father from 
the gang but never physically harming him.  The asylum officer 
found Galeas Figueroa to be credible and referred him for a 
withholding-only hearing before an Immigration Judge.  See    
8 C.F.R. 1208.31(e). 
 
At that hearing, Galeas Figueroa applied for withholding of 
removal under the INA and the CAT.1  In testifying again about 
events that occurred in Honduras before his first illegal entry, 
Galeas Figueroa was no longer uncertain about who had 
harmed his family and threatened to kill him – it was the Mara 
18 gang.  Galeas Figueroa ascribed several motives to the 
gang’s murder of his father: his father reported to the police 
that gang members raped his sister; his father tried to protect 
another woman who was raped by the gang; his father 
participated in a farmers’ organization (which, as Galeas 
Figueroa reported, was a rival of another organization 
comprised of gang members); and his father was involved in 
anti-gang political activities.  Galeas Figueroa also added 
another previously omitted detail – in addition to threatening 
to kill him for taking care of his father, the gang once beat him 
on the back with a belt buckle.  Galeas Figueroa stated that he 
did not inform the Immigration Judge at his prior hearing about 
 
1 Galeas Figueroa conceded that he was statutorily ineligible 
for asylum due to the denial of his prior asylum application and 




everything that had happened to him because he feared 
retaliation from the gang.  
  
Galeas Figueroa also described other later-in-time 
developments.  He alleged that the Mara 18 gang continued to 
threaten him and his family, including threatening to cut out 
his brother’s tongue.  He also testified that the gang called 
twice (first his mother and then him directly) with death threats 
after his 2011 removal to Honduras.   
 
Those threats prompted Galeas Figueroa to enter the United 
States again in 2012.  After his arrival, Galeas Figueroa learned 
from his mother in Honduras that the gang shot at their house 
and killed his dog.  And later, in 2014, the gang phoned Galeas 
Figueroa and threatened to kidnap his children in Honduras 
unless he paid a ransom.  Rather than pay the gang, Galeas 
Figueroa’s mother brought the children to the United States.  
Since that time, neither Galeas Figueroa nor his mother (who 
returned to Honduras) has received any threats from the gang. 
   
Galeas Figueroa also submitted evidence to show that the 
Honduran government could not and would not protect him 
from the gang.  He produced police reports that had been filed 
concerning his sister’s rape, his family members’ murders, and 
the threatened kidnapping of his children.  He also testified that 
those reports never resulted in any arrests and that the 
Honduran police were allied with the gang.   
 
Following the hearing, the Immigration Judge determined 
that Galeas Figueroa was not entitled to withholding of 
removal under the INA or the CAT.  The Immigration Judge 
invoked res judicata and collateral estoppel to prevent 
relitigating any issues resolved at his first removal hearing.  
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And considering only the events that occurred after his first 
removal, the Immigration Judge found that, although Galeas 
Figueroa was credible, he had not suffered past persecution.  
The Immigration Judge nonetheless found that Galeas 
Figueroa faced a clear probability of future harm in Honduras 
due to his membership in a particular social group (his father’s 
family).  However, because Galeas Figueroa did not 
demonstrate that such harm from private actors would 
constitute persecution or torture, he was ineligible for relief 
from removal. 
   
Galeas Figueroa administratively appealed that decision to 
the BIA.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3).  Unlike the Immigration 
Judge, the BIA considered all of Galeas Figueroa’s allegations 
of past harm, including events from before his first removal 
hearing.  Like the Immigration Judge, the BIA concluded that 
Galeas Figueroa did not demonstrate past persecution or a 
likelihood of future persecution or torture.  In denying statutory 
withholding of removal, the BIA recognized a likelihood that 
Galeas Figueroa would be a victim of harmful conduct by 
private actors.  But, using two legal tests interchangeably, the 
BIA determined that Galeas Figueroa did not establish either 
that the Honduran government was “unable or unwilling to 
control” the Mara 18 gang, BIA Op. 2 (AR4), or that the 
government “condoned the private actions or at least 
demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect [him],” id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re A-B-, 
27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337 (A.G. 2018)) (AR4).  Because Galeas 
Figueroa did not satisfy either of those tests, the BIA found that 
the harmful conduct of the Mara 18 gang could not be 
attributed to the Honduran government.  For a similar reason, 
the BIA concluded that Galeas Figueroa was not entitled to 
CAT protection: he did not demonstrate that public officials in 
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Honduras would acquiesce to the gang’s violence.  Based on 
those findings, the BIA affirmed the Immigration Judge’s 
decision and entered a final order of removal.   
 
Galeas Figueroa timely petitioned for review of that order, 
bringing his case within this Court’s jurisdiction.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1). 
 
C. The Government’s Motion to Dismiss Galeas 
Figueroa’s Petition 
 
Galeas Figueroa’s petition did not automatically stay his 
removal.  Accordingly, to prevent his removal during the 
pendency of the petition, Galeas Figueroa moved for a stay.2  
That motion was denied.   
 
At that point, without a court-ordered stay, the Government 
could remove Galeas Figueroa during the pendency of this 
petition.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (“Service of the petition 
[for review] on the officer or employee does not stay the 
removal of an alien pending the court’s decision on the 
petition, unless the court orders otherwise.”).  And while this 
matter was pending, the Government produced one piece of 
circumstantial evidence suggesting that Galeas Figueroa 
received an order to report to custody for removal and that he 
violated that order.  The evidence, a Notice of Immigration 
Bond Breach (ICE Form I-323), was not addressed to Galeas 
Figueroa but to his bond obligor.  That document indicated that 
 
2 Through an order implementing this Court’s standing order 
of August 8, 2015, upon filing his motion for a stay, Galeas 
Figueroa received a temporary stay of removal only for the 
pendency of his motion to stay. 
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the bond obligor did not deliver Galeas Figueroa to 
governmental custody, and it notified the bond obligor that the 
cash bond would be forfeited.   
 
Based on that form, the Government asserted that Galeas 
Figueroa was a fugitive and moved to dismiss Galeas 
Figueroa’s petition under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. 
   
II. DISCUSSION 
 
A. The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine 
 
As a threshold matter, if Galeas Figueroa is a fugitive, then 
this Court may, in its discretion, dismiss his petition under the 
fugitive disentitlement doctrine.  That doctrine originates in the 
criminal context, and, as explained by the Supreme Court, it 
protects a court’s ability to enforce its judgments by permitting 
dismissal of a fugitive’s appeal: 
 
No persuasive reason exists why this Court 
should proceed to adjudicate the merits of a 
criminal case after the convicted defendant who 
has sought review escapes from the restraints 
placed upon him pursuant to the conviction.  
While such an escape does not strip the case of 
its character as an adjudicable case or 
controversy, we believe it disentitles the 
defendant to call upon the resources of the Court 
for determination of his claims. 
Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) (per 
curiam); see also Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 
234, 239 (1993) (“It has been settled for well over a century 
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that an appellate court may dismiss the appeal of a defendant 
who is a fugitive from justice during the pendency of his 
appeal.”); Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876) (“It is 
clearly within our discretion to refuse to hear a criminal case 
in error, unless the convicted party, suing out the writ, is where 
he can be made to respond to any judgment we may render.”).  
This Court has applied the doctrine in the criminal context, see 
United States v. Wright, 902 F.2d 241, 242–43 (3d Cir. 1990); 
Virgin Islands v. James, 621 F.2d 588, 589 (3d Cir. 1980) (per 
curiam), and in an asset-freeze case, see In re Assets of Martin, 
1 F.3d 1351, 1356–57 (3d Cir. 1993).  It has further recognized 
that “nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion [in Molinaro] 
suggests that the rule announced there is applicable only in the 
criminal-law context.”  Arana v. INS, 673 F.2d 75, 77 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (per curiam).  Accordingly, this Circuit – along with 
every other circuit to consider the issue3 – has applied the 
doctrine in the immigration context.  See id. at 76–77. 
 
Dismissal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine 
remains discretionary, and the Supreme Court has cautioned 
 
3 See Martin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 1201, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 
2008); Giri v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 833, 835–36 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(per curiam); Garcia-Flores v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 439, 441–
42 (6th Cir. 2007); Sapoundjiev v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 727, 
728–30 (7th Cir. 2004); Antonio-Martinez v. INS, 317 F.3d 
1089, 1091–93 (9th Cir. 2003); Bar-Levy v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
990 F.2d 33, 34–35 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Hassan v. 
Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 516 (8th Cir. 2007) (recognizing the 
doctrine, but declining to apply it after an alien voluntarily 
departed but then failed to meet with government officials to 
discuss her request for a stay of deportation while no longer in 
the United States). 
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against “too free a recourse” to the “sanction of 
disentitlement.”  Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 828 
(1996); see also Wright, 902 F.2d at 243 (stating that dismissal 
under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is discretionary).  As 
a limiting principle, this Court has explained that “permitting 
‘an appellate court to sanction by dismissal any conduct that 
exhibited disrespect for any aspect of the judicial system, even 
where such conduct has no connection to the course of the 
appellate proceedings,’ would sweep too broadly.”  Marran v. 
Marran, 376 F.3d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Ortega-
Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 246).  But the doctrine unquestionably 
allows dismissal of an appeal when a fugitive has violated a 
court order to appear.  See, e.g., Arana, 673 F.2d at 77.  
Similarly, violation of an immigration agency’s order to appear 
is sufficiently connected to a fugitive’s petition for review of a 
final order of removal to allow for dismissal under the doctrine.  
See, e.g., Martin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 1201, 1202–03, 1207 
(10th Cir. 2008); Giri v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 833, 834–35 (5th 
Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Gao v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 173, 174 
(2d Cir. 2007). 
 
But here, the Government fails to produce sufficient 
evidence of such a violation.  The sole evidence proffered by 
the Government, the Notice of Immigration Bond Breach (ICE 
Form I-323), may well have been issued because Galeas 
Figueroa violated an order to report to custody for removal.  
But drawing such an inference on the paucity of evidence 
presented here is not warranted.  More probative evidence of 
Galeas Figueroa’s fugitive status – such as an order requiring 
Galeas Figueroa to report to custody coupled with proof that 
he did not do so – should be readily available.  And without 
more evidence that Galeas Figueroa is now a fugitive, we 
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decline to impose the “most severe” sanction of dismissal.  
Degen, 517 U.S. at 828.4 
 
B. Statutory Withholding of Removal Under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act 
Through his petition, Galeas Figueroa challenges the BIA’s 
denial of his request for statutory withholding of removal under 
the INA.  To be entitled to such withholding, an applicant must 
prove that it is more likely than not that he or she will be 
persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion 
upon removal to a particular country.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(A); see also INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429–30 
(1984); Gonzalez-Posada v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 684 
(3d Cir. 2015).  If an applicant makes a showing of future 
persecution, then he or she cannot be removed to that country 
but may be removed to another country.  See Doe v. Att’y Gen., 
956 F.3d 135, 155 (3d Cir. 2020) (noting that “withholding of 
removal is nondiscretionary”); Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 
542, 545 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Withholding of removal . . . confers 
only the right not to be deported to a particular country—not a 
right to remain in this one.”).   
 
 
4 Had the Government produced more probative evidence that 
Galeas Figueroa breached an order to report to custody, then 
dismissal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine would 
have been appropriate.  See Sapoundjev, 376 F.3d at 729 
(“When an alien fails to report for custody, this sets up the 
situation . . . called ‘heads I win, tails you’ll never find me.’” 
(quoting Antonio-Martinez, 317 F.3d at 1093)). 
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Here, the BIA agreed with the Immigration Judge’s 
determination that Galeas Figueroa had demonstrated a 
likelihood of future harm on account of a protected ground 
(membership in a particular social group, his father’s family) 
upon his return to Honduras.5  But that alone does not suffice 
for persecution: the government must also be complicit to some 
degree in the harm through either act or omission.  See 
Harutyunyan v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 64, 68 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(“[P]ersecution always implies some connection to 
government action or inaction.”); Rodas-Mendoza v. INS, 
246 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[V]iolence that the 
government does not sponsor and in which it is not complicit[] 
cannot support a reasonable fear of persecution.”).  And the 
 
5 The BIA reached that conclusion without affording Galeas 
Figueroa a presumption of future persecution: it determined 
that he did not establish past persecution and thus did not 
qualify for that presumption.  See generally 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.16(b)(1) (providing that proof of past persecution raises 
a rebuttable presumption of future persecution).  Galeas 
Figueroa disputes that finding, arguing that the BIA failed to 
consider the cumulative suffering he endured and that the 
limited harm considered by the BIA still suffices for 
persecution.  But persecution is not established by harm alone, 
and the BIA concluded that the Honduran government was not 
sufficiently culpable for those prior harmful acts.  Because, as 
explained infra, that separate determination regarding the 
involvement of the Honduran government was not erroneous, 
any error in assessing the magnitude of past harms was 
harmless.  See Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 
2011) (applying the harmless error doctrine to a final order of 
the BIA such that remand is unnecessary “when it is highly 
probable that the error did not affect the outcome of the case”). 
 
16 
BIA determined that the danger Galeas Figueroa feared from 
the Mara 18 gang did not sufficiently implicate acts or 
omissions of the Honduran government to constitute 
persecution.   
 
The BIA arrived at that conclusion by treating as 
interchangeable two legal standards for determining whether 
the harmful conduct of private actors may be attributed to the 
government.  The first standard – the unable-or-unwilling-to-
control test – evaluates whether the government was “unable 
or unwilling to control” the individual or group that committed 
the harm.  Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 502 F.3d 285, 
288 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see also In re Acosta, 
19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985) (“[H]arm or suffering 
ha[s] to be inflicted either by the government of a country or 
by persons or an organization that the government was unable 
or unwilling to control.”).  The second standard – the condone-
or-complete-helplessness test – examines whether the “the 
government condoned the private actions or at least 
demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the victims.”  
A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
Galeas Figueroa challenges two aspects of the BIA’s 
analysis.  First, he contends that the two legal tests are not 
interchangeable, submitting instead that the condone-or-
complete-helplessness test imposes a heightened standard, 
which the BIA erred by applying.  Second, he argues that the 
unable-or-unwilling-to-control test should govern his case and 
that, under that test, he would be entitled to statutory 
withholding.  As he sees it, the record lacks substantial 
evidence that the Honduran government would be able and 
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willing to control the Mara 18 gang.  As explained below, 
neither argument succeeds. 
  
1. The Legal Equivalence of the Unable-or-
Unwilling-to-Control Test and the 
Condone-or-Complete-Helplessness Test 
Galeas Figueroa’s challenge to the BIA’s denial of 
statutory withholding rests on his contention that the two legal 
standards for private-actor persecution are distinct and may not 
be treated as legal alternatives.6  That is an incorrect premise.  
 
6  Related to his contention that the two standards for private-
actor persecution are distinct, Galeas Figueroa also argues that 
through the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, Congress incorporated the unable-
or-unwilling-to-control standard into the INA.  But that is 
immaterial because, as explained infra, the two standards are 
legally equivalent.  Moreover, it would be inappropriate to 
apply the prior construction canon here.  That canon requires a 
settled meaning of a statutory provision at the time of that 
provision’s reenactment.  See Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. 
Corp., 137 S. Ct. 553, 563 (2017); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 
524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998) (“When administrative and judicial 
interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory 
provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute 
indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its 
administrative and judicial interpretations as well.”).  And 
before IIRIRA’s enactment, courts had not uniformly applied 
the unable-or-willing-to-control formulation as the standard 
for private-actor persecution.  See, e.g., Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 





neither condoned by the state nor the prevailing social norm, it 
clearly does not amount to ‘persecution’ within the meaning of 
the Act.” (emphasis added)); Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, 17 F.3d 
33, 37 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he statute protects against 
persecution . . . by nongovernmental groups that the 
government cannot control.” (emphasis added)); Adebisi v. 
INS, 952 F.2d 910, 914 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting the unable-or-
unwilling-to-control test, but also finding that the feared harm 
“does not arise from activities instigated or sanctioned by” the 
government (emphasis added)); Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100, 102 
(1st Cir. 1971) (stating that nongovernmental acts may 
constitute persecution where the group “has sufficient de facto 
political power to carry out its purposes without effective 
hindrance” (emphasis added)); Dunat v. Hurney, 297 F.2d 744, 
746 (3d Cir. 1961) (observing that the INA “does not concern 
itself with the manner in which physical persecution is 
inflicted, so long as that is the net effect of the forces or the 
circumstances that the . . . government will impose” (emphasis 
added)).  Nor had the BIA.  See, e.g., In re Maccaud, 14 I. & N. 
Dec. 429, 434 (B.I.A. 1973) (stating that “persecution must be 
at the hands of the government, unless the government cannot 
control the persecutors” (emphasis added)); In re Tan, 
12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 568 (B.I.A. 1967) (“Mob action may be a 
ground for staying deportation under section 243(h) where it is 
established that a government cannot control the mob.” 
(emphasis added)); In re Eusaph, 10 I. & N. Dec. 453, 454–55 
(B.I.A. 1964) (stating that private-actor persecution arises 
when the government is “unable to take proper measures to 
control individual cases of violence” or when the private 
violence is “the result of a program sponsored or tolerated” by 




Although the tests use different expressions, they are legally 
equivalent. 
 
Both tests have an overriding commonality: they recognize 
that to constitute persecution, the government must be 
complicit to some degree in the harmful conduct of non-
governmental actors through either act or omission.  The 
unable-or-unwilling-to-control test does so by requiring that 
the feared harm be inflicted “by forces that the government is 
unable or unwilling to control.”  Orellana v. Att’y Gen.,         
956 F.3d 171, 178 (3d Cir. 2020) (emphasis added); accord 
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222 (explaining that the harm must 
be inflicted “by persons or an organization that the government 
was unable or unwilling to control” (emphasis added)).  
Similarly, the condone-or-complete-helplessness test requires 
a showing “that the government condoned the private actions 
or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the 
 
“condones” (emphasis added)); In re Stojkovic, 10 I. & N. Dec. 
281, 286–87 (B.I.A. 1963) (declining to decide “whether 
physical harm inflicted upon a person by a mob acting without 
governmental sanction” constitutes persecution because “there 
is no evidence that the authorities could not adequately protect 
respondent by controlling any outbursts of mob violence” 
(emphasis added)); In re Diaz, 10 I. & N. Dec. 199, 204–05 
(B.I.A. 1963) (declining to decide whether “governmental 
authorities must inflict or sanction the physical persecution” 




victims.”  A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337 (emphasis added) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Despite that commonality, the two tests are formulated 
differently.  In the abstract, ‘complete helplessness’ suggests a 
greater incapacity than ‘unable to control.’  Similarly, 
untethered to context, ‘condone’ implies a degree of approval 
not necessarily present in ‘unwilling to control.’   
 
But those terms do not operate in isolation; the words 
surrounding those terms affect their meaning.  Notably, the 
tests measure the degree of the government’s relationship to 
different aspects of private-actor persecution – either to the 
private actor, the harmful conduct, or the victim.  The unable-
or-unwilling-to-control test examines whether the government 
is unable or unwilling to control the private actor who inflicts 
harm.  See Orellana, 956 F.3d at 178; Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
at 222.  By contrast, the first component of the condone-or-
complete-helplessness test assesses whether the government 
condoned the harm.  See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337.  And the 
second component evaluates whether the government has 
demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the potential 
victim of the private harm.  See id. 
 
A proper comparison of the tests thus requires examining 
their effect as to the same aspect of private-actor persecution.  
And that can be done by examining how each test applies to 
the potential victim of private harm – the applicant seeking 
relief from removal.   
 
From that perspective, the unable-or-unwilling-to-control 
test is a shorthand of sorts.  It depends on more than merely the 
government’s inability or unwillingness to control a violent 
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group in the abstract.  Rather, that inability or unwillingness to 
control a violent group becomes relevant only in the context of 
a specific individual, the applicant.  And a government’s 
inability or unwillingness to control a violent group as a 
general matter does not necessarily mean that the government 
cannot or will not protect the specific applicant.  See 
Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 502 F.3d at 289 (linking the unable-or-
unwilling-to-control test to the government’s protection of the 
victim); see also In re McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec. 542, 544–45 
(B.I.A. 1980) (same).  Accordingly, the unable-or-unwilling-
to-control test evaluates the government’s ability and 
willingness to control private actors not at a general level, but 
rather with respect to the specific applicant seeking relief.   
 
The condone-or-complete-helplessness test similarly 
focuses on the applicant, only more explicitly.  The ‘complete 
helplessness’ component assesses the government’s ability to 
protect a particular applicant from private harmful conduct.  
And the ‘condone’ component examines whether the 
government condoned private harm to that applicant.   
 
Recognizing those differences, the corresponding parts of 
each test may be compared.  The apparent capacity differential 
between ‘unable to control’ and ‘complete helplessness’ relates 
to different objects.  The ‘unable to control’ prong describes 
the government’s power relative to private actors who intend 
to harm the applicant for asylum or withholding.  The 
‘complete helplessness’ prong describes a different 
relationship, the government’s power in relation to the 
potential victim.  Calibrating for context, however, harmonizes 
the two standards: when the government is unable to control 
private actors with respect to a specific potential victim, it 
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demonstrates a complete helplessness to protect that victim 
from those actors.  
  
Surrounding words also aid comparison of the other 
analogous components of the two tests.  The ‘unwilling to 
control’ prong describes the relationship between the 
government and a private actor as it affects the safety of the 
applicant for asylum or withholding.  By contrast, the 
‘condone’ prong describes the government’s relationship not 
to private actors, but to the harm those private actors inflict.  
Thus, those two standards – ‘unwilling to control’ and 
‘condone’ – derive their meaning from separate objects.  
Accounting for that, the two standards converge – at least when 
a government is unwilling but able to control a violent group 
for purposes of protecting the applicant.  In that case, when the 
government can protect the individual but does not, it condones 
the group’s harmful acts through its unwillingness to control 
the group.   
 
Nonetheless, the parity between the ‘condone’ and 
‘unwilling to control’ prongs has a limit.  While the two 
formulations cover the same ground when the government is 
unwilling but able to control a violent group, that congruence 
ceases when the government is unwilling and unable to control 
a violent group.  In that latter circumstance, the government 
cannot be said to condone harm inflicted by a violent group 
that the government is unable to control.  Therefore, the 
‘condone’ prong is not coterminous with the ‘unwilling to 
control’ prong in all instances.   
 
But that gap is not fatal to the legal equivalence of the two 
tests.  As explained above, when a government is unable to 
control a violent group with respect to a particular person, that 
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government is completely helpless to protect that person from 
that group.  Thus, through the combined operation of the 
‘condone’ and ‘complete helplessness’ prongs, the condone-
or-complete-helplessness test becomes legally equivalent to 
the unable-or-unwilling-to-control test.  By either condoning 
private harm or being completely helpless to protect a potential 
victim from such harm, a government is sufficiently culpable 
to have committed persecution.   
 
A broader perspective confirms that conclusion.  The 
unable-or-unwilling-to-control standard governs four discrete 
factual scenarios of governmental responsiveness to private-
actor harm:  
• Scenario 1 – able and willing to control the 
violent group;  
• Scenario 2 – unable but willing to control the 
violent group;  
• Scenario 3 – able but unwilling to control the 
violent group; and  
• Scenario 4 – unable and unwilling to control 
the violent group.   
Under the unable-or-unwilling-to-control test, a government is 
complicit in private-actor persecution in all but Scenario 1 – 
that is in Scenarios 2, 3, and 4.  The condone-or-complete-
helplessness standard yields the same result.  By operation of 
the ‘complete helplessness’ prong, the government is culpable 
for private harm in Scenarios 2 and 4 because in both instances 
the government is unable to protect the victim from the private 
actors.  And the ‘condone’ prong renders the government 
complicit in private harm in Scenario 3.  In that circumstance, 
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by having the ability but not the willingness to prevent the 
harm, the government condones the harm to the victim.  
Accordingly, both tests generate the same results in each of the 
four factual scenarios. 
 
For these reasons, the unable-or-unwilling-to-control test 
and the condone-or-complete-helplessness test are legally 
equivalent alternatives.  Distilled to their essence, both tests 
stand for the same fundamental proposition: if a government is 
willing and able to afford some protection to an individual 
against harms inflicted by private actors, then that government 
is not sufficiently complicit in the private conduct for those 
acts to constitute persecution for purposes of relief from 
removal. 
     
Of the other circuits to consider this issue, all but one have 
reached a similar conclusion.  Several circuits use the condone-
or-complete-helplessness test as an alternative for the unable-
or-unwilling-to-control test.  See, e.g., Guillen-Hernandez v. 
Holder, 592 F.3d 883, 886–87 (8th Cir. 2010); Shehu v. 
Gonzales, 443 F.3d 435, 437 (5th Cir. 2006); Galina v. INS, 
213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Kere v. Gonzales, 
252 F. App’x 708, 712 (6th Cir. 2007).  And some have 
expressly held that the two standards are the same.  See Scarlett 
v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 331–34 (2d Cir. 2020); Gonzales-Veliz 
v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 233–34 (5th Cir. 2019); see also Rosales 
Justo v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 154, 166 n.9 (1st Cir. 2018) 
(describing A-B-’s description of the government-nexus 
requirement as “consistent with our precedent”).  This 
conclusion also comports with the most recent interpretation 
by the former Acting Attorney General in an administratively 
precedential decision.  That opinion, In re A-B- II, explained 
that “[t]he ‘complete helplessness’ language does not depart 
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from the ‘unable or unwilling’ standard; the two are 
interchangeable formulations.”  28 I. & N. Dec. 199, 200–02 
(A.G. 2021). 
 
The sole outlier is the D.C. Circuit.  It has rejected the legal 
equivalence of the tests, holding instead that the condone-or-
complete-helplessness test imposes a heightened standard for 
private-actor persecution claims.  See Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 
883, 897–900 (D.C. Cir. 2020).  But that decision does not 
account for the combined effect of the two prongs of the 
condone-or-complete-helplessness test; instead, it isolates the 
standards from their surrounding words and overlooks the 
relationships they describe.  See id. at 898–99.  We are neither 
persuaded nor bound by that analysis.7  Instead, we align with 
the majority of circuits to have considered this issue by holding 
that the unable-or-unwilling-to-control test and the condone-
or-complete-helplessness test are legally equivalent for 
purposes of evaluating private-actor persecution. 
 
 
7 Although a partial affirmance of a nationwide injunction, the 
D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Grace does not govern this case.  
Galeas Figueroa was not a party to that litigation, and his 
petition does not relate to the enjoined conduct: the 
Government’s process for making credible fear 
determinations.  See Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 
105 (D.D.C. 2018) (permanently enjoining the government 
from continuing to apply credible fear policies).  And even if 
Galeas Figueroa were within the scope of the limited 
injunction, it is uncertain whether the injunction of the A-B- 
decision has any lingering potency after A-B- II.   
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2. Substantial Evidence Supports the BIA’s 
Determination of No Private-Actor 
Persecution 
Applying both the unable-or-unwilling-to-control test and 
the condone-or-complete-helplessness test, the BIA denied 
Galeas Figueroa’s application for statutory withholding.  
Specifically, the BIA found that Galeas Figueroa had failed to 
establish that the Honduran government “condoned the acts of 
violence or is completely helpless to protect victims of crime,” 
or is “unable or unwilling to control the feared gangs.”  BIA 
Op. 2–3 (AR4–5).  Those factual findings are subject to 
substantial-evidence review and may not be set aside “unless 
any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to 
the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Doe,           
956 F.3d at 140; Mendoza-Ordonez v. Att’y Gen., 869 F.3d 
164, 170 n.15 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 
Galeas Figueroa contends that two pieces of record 
evidence compel the conclusion that the Honduran government 
cannot or will not control the Mara 18 gang.  First, he cites the 
non-investigation and non-prosecution of the gang for its 
repeated violence toward his family, despite the filing of 
multiple police reports.  Second, he relies on the State 
Department’s country conditions report for Honduras, which 
identifies the Mara 18 gang as among the criminal elements 
that “committed murders, extortion, kidnappings, human 
trafficking, and acts of intimidation against police, prosecutors, 
journalists, women, and human rights defenders.”  U.S. Dep’t 
of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Country Report 
on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Honduras 4 (2016) 




The BIA considered Galeas Figueroa’s evidence.  It 
acknowledged that “multiple police reports were filed, without 
satisfactory results, when [Galeas Figueroa’s] family members 
were killed or harmed or he was threatened.”  BIA Op. 2 
(AR4).  The BIA also recognized that, according to the country 
conditions report, “many murders in Honduras go unsolved,” 
and the government “has been unable to completely eradicate 
gangs.”  Id.   
 
But the BIA ultimately determined that “the Honduran 
government has taken significant steps to combat gang 
violence and public corruption” – reflecting neither an inability 
nor an unwillingness to protect Galeas Figueroa from the gang.  
Id. at 2–3 (AR4–5).  In addition, the BIA concluded that the 
lack of success in prosecuting the gang members for their past 
violent acts could be due to the vagueness and deficiencies in 
the police reports that Galeas Figueroa and his family filed – 
not the government’s condonation of the gang’s harmful acts 
or its complete helplessness to protect him.  Indeed, one report 
was filed years after the incident, and most of the others did 
not even describe the assailants, let alone identify them as gang 
members.  The BIA thus found that the record evidence, 
considered as a whole, was insufficient to justify relief. 
 
Because a reasonable adjudicator would not be compelled 
to reject that conclusion, substantial evidence supports the 
BIA’s denial of Galeas Figueroa’s application for statutory 
withholding of removal.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); 
Espinosa-Cortez v. Att’y Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 
2010) (recognizing that substantial-evidence review is “highly 




C. Protection Under the Convention Against 
Torture 
 
Galeas Figueroa next challenges the BIA’s denial of his 
request for withholding of removal under the Convention 
Against Torture.  To qualify for mandatory CAT withholding, 
an alien must demonstrate that “it is more likely than not that 
he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country 
of removal.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2020).  As defined by 
the CAT implementing regulations, torture is “an extreme form 
of cruel and inhuman treatment.”  Id. § 1208.18(a)(2); see 
Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 151 (3d Cir. 2005) (listing the 
elements of torture).  One of the elements of torture requires 
that the severe pain or suffering be inflicted “by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.”  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.18(a)(1) (2020); see also Auguste, 395 F.3d at 151.  
  
The BIA determined that Galeas Figueroa failed to prove 
that element, and on that basis, it denied CAT relief.  Galeas 
Figueroa disputes that ruling and contends that through willful 
blindness, the Honduran government would acquiesce to his 
likely torture by the Mara 18 gang.  See Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y 
Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 65 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[A]n alien can satisfy 
the burden established for CAT relief by producing sufficient 
evidence that the government in question is willfully blind to 
such activities.”). 
 
In this Circuit, the analysis of governmental acquiescence 
to torture involves a two-part inquiry.  See Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 
855 F.3d 509, 516 (3d Cir. 2017).  The first question is one of 
fact: How will public officials likely act in response to the harm 
that the alien fears?  The second step involves a legal question: 
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Will the public officials’ likely response amount to 
acquiescence? 
 
Regarding the first inquiry – the government’s likely 
response to the feared harm – the BIA concluded that public 
officials in Honduras would likely investigate the threats 
against Galeas Figueroa.  Under the “highly deferential” 
substantial-evidence standard of review that applies to the 
agency’s factual findings, Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 
1692 (2020), that determination is “conclusive unless any 
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 
contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 
 
Galeas Figueroa disputes the BIA’s conclusion.  He relies 
on the government’s failure to prosecute the gang members for 
their violent acts against him and his family.  And he also cites 
the country conditions report’s identification of the Mara 18 
gang as a dangerous criminal group in Honduras. 
   
Consistent with its obligation to consider “all evidence 
relevant to the possibility of future torture,” 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.16(c)(3) (2020), the BIA weighed Galeas Figueroa’s 
evidence.  It acknowledged that “the Honduran government 
was unable to bring the gang members who harmed [Galeas 
Figueroa’s] family to justice.”  BIA Op. 3 (AR5); see also id. 
at 2 (AR4) (recognizing that “many murders in Honduras go 
unsolved”).  But even accounting for that evidence, the BIA 
determined that “the Honduran government is actively taking 
measures to combat gang violence,” such that the Honduran 
police would likely take a report and open an investigation.  Id. 
at 3 (AR5); see also id. at 2 (AR4) (confirming that “the 
Honduran government has taken significant steps to combat 
gang violence and public corruption”).  While every predictive 
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judgment is subject to second-guessing, especially when it 
involves the behavior of foreign governmental actors, the 
BIA’s conclusion is not one that a reasonable adjudicator 
would be compelled to reject.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  
Therefore, the BIA’s factual assessment of the Honduran 
government’s likely response to the pain or suffering that 
Galeas Figueroa may experience in Honduras survives 
substantial-evidence review.   
 
As a legal question, the second acquiescence inquiry – 
whether the government’s likely response constitutes 
acquiescence – receives de novo review.  See Myrie, 855 F.3d 
at 515–16.  On this issue, Galeas Figueroa argues that the 
Honduran government would acquiesce through willful 
blindness to his future harm in Honduras.  But a government 
that investigates reports of private violence is not willfully 
blind to that violence.  See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 
663 F.3d 582, 610–12 (3d Cir. 2011) (upholding the BIA’s 
determination that the Honduran government was not willfully 
blind to gang violence where the police were investigating five 
police reports, even though the victim “never saw any 
progress” (citation omitted)).  Nor does the ineffectiveness of 
the Honduran police in solving the Galeas Figueroa family’s 
prior reports of crime mean that investigations of future reports 
of crime would be so unsuccessful as to constitute 
acquiescence.  The delay by the Galeas Figueroa family in 
reporting a crime along with the incomplete leads they 
provided made the investigations more difficult.  And as the 
BIA recognized, the Honduran government has since improved 
its anti-crime efforts.  Thus, as a matter of law, the Honduran 
government’s likely response to future reports of crime – 





Accordingly, neither prong of the acquiescence inquiry 
provides a basis to grant Galeas Figueroa’s petition for CAT 
withholding.  Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s 
conclusion that the Honduran government would likely 
investigate reports that Galeas Figueroa would make to the 
police.  And on this record, that response does not constitute 
acquiescence.  
 
* * * 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny both the 
Government’s motion to dismiss and Galeas Figueroa’s 
petition seeking statutory withholding of removal and CAT 
protection. 
